Crew Resource Management and Its Possible Role in Nursing Risk Management by McAndrew, I. R. & Wise, G. P.
Publications 
6-2014 
Crew Resource Management and Its Possible Role in Nursing Risk 
Management 
I. R. McAndrew 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, mcand4f1@erau.edu 
G. P. Wise 
Southampton Trust Hospital 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication 
 Part of the Aviation Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
McAndrew, I. R., & Wise, G. P. (2014). Crew Resource Management and Its Possible Role in Nursing Risk 
Management. Risk Analysis 2014: 9th International Conference on Risk Analysis and Hazard Mitigation, 
47(). https://doi.org/10.2495/RISK140221 
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, 
please contact commons@erau.edu. 
Crew Resource Management and its  
possible role in nursing risk management 
I. R. McAndrew1 & G. P. Wise2  
1Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, USA 
2Southampton Trust Hospital, UK  
Abstract 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) was introduced within the aviation industry 
in the late 1970s after an aircraft ran out of fuel whilst the pilots were trying to 
solve an undercarriage problem. To reduce such errors and ultimately lower the 
probability of failure and the severity of risks that occur, training in CRM was 
rolled out across the whole industry. It has been successful over the last few 
years in major reductions in the number of crashes and fatalities in the 
commercial aviation sector. Nursing has similar concerns in that errors can 
ultimately result in fatalities [1]. There are parallels in the needs and expectations 
of pilots and nurses to assess risk, reduce risk and deliver reliable and 
dependable professional services. In this paper the parallels of pilots and nurses 
demands are compared to assess if the lessons learned in aviation can assist 
nurses deliver procedures with lower risks. The analysis will draw on the 
demands and expectations and how they both deal with risk, challenging errors 
and ensuring that identified risks are not overlooked or ignored [2]. Finally, 
suggestions of adopting, sharing and benchmarking between these two industries 
can adopt best practices so that both industries can learn from each other. 
Keywords:  Crew Resource Management, nursing, error reduction. 
1 Introduction 
The aviation industry has an extensive history of errors, mishaps, accidents and 
disasters that stretch back before the first powered flight by the Wright Brothers 
in 1903. These have been on small scale up to the world’s highest fatality in the 
Tenerife disaster of 1977 when 583 people died in one accident. This disaster 
occurred due to human error when one pilot made the decision that the fog 
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bound runway was clear for take-off whilst not knowing that Air Traffic Control 
had given permission to taxi on the runway. The result was a collision at speed 
when one B-747 accelerating down the runway hit another B-747 taxing. The 
subsequent investigation highlighted several errors and mistakes that had 
happened, with the primary reason being human error and confusion.  
 
 
Figure 1: Simulated image of impact between the two B-747s. 
     Aviation has many examples of things gone wrong and the advantage of this 
industry is that it has systems in place to learn by its mistakes [3]. This Tenerife 
incident brought about a quantum shift in the training of pilots, air traffic 
controllers and personal involved with the safe operations of flight.  
     Below in figure 2 it shows the number of hull (total) loses from the 1940s 
until present day. This clearly shows the increases that occurred up until the 
1970s, when there has been a steady trend downwards. Given that this represents 
the industry as a whole there needs to be a clear explanation of what this graphs 
shows and does not show [4]. Accidents occur for a variety of reasons, with the 
most prominent ones being: human error, mechanical and weather conditions. 
The increase in commercial aviation increased post World War II and that also 
increased the probability of accidents pro rata up to the 1970s. Passenger 
numbers have increased almost exponentially since the 1980s; however, the 
accident rate per flying hour has reduced over this period. It is statistically true to 
say that flying is now safer than any time before. The exact reasons are complex 
and one single action can claim its success [5]. Design theory is better, 
computers to simulate and maintenance practices that are robust and 
internationally accepted all assist in the reduction of accident. The principal 
reason of any crash is still human error, whether a mistake, not accommodating 
for weather conditions or lack of training or knowledge. The Tenerife accident 
ignited the governing bodies around the world to identify deficiencies in training 
and this started the subject of Crew Resource Management (CRM). It can be 
argued this was the seminal moment when the aviation industry realised that 
substantial responsibility was required to ensure the likelihood of any accident 
was always at its minimum. 
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 Figure 2: Number of fatalities from airliners (14+ passengers) hull loss 
accidents per year. In red is the 5-year average.  
     Figure 3 it shows the trend of accidents, reported per 100,000 hours of flying. 
This trend is represented alike in both Europe, North America. Regardless of 
what are the reasons why there is a reduction it is continuing to make aviation 
the safest form of transport [6]. It is worth noting that the percentage of 
categories assigned to the cause of an accident have not significantly changed in 
the past 50 years, only the number of incidences. It will be argued by many that 
CRM is a significant influence on this continuing improvement. 
 
Figure 3: Accident rates per 100,000 flying hours. 
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     Reasons for accidents apart from runway hazards can all be related to CRM 
and the ineffective use of communications. The International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) in 1944 at the Chicago convention designated that English 
will be the universal language for aviation. Thus, any international flights must 
use English for communication between Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) and other 
communication links. Therefore, the majority of pilots flying outside of their 
home county will be using English as a second language. Using that point half of 
the reasons listed in Table 1 will involve a translation into a second language.   
Table 1:  Percentage breakdown of principal reasons attributable to aviation 
accidents. 
Reason for Accident % 
Pilot deviated from basic operational 
procedures 
33% 
Inadequate cross-check by second crew 
member 
26% 
Design faults 13% 
Maintenance and inspection deficiencies 12% 
Absence of approach guidance 10% 
Captain ignored crew inputs 10% 
Air traffic control failures or errors 9% 
Improper crew response during abnormal 
conditions 
9% 
Insufficient or incorrect weather information 8% 
Runways hazards 7% 
Air traffic control/crew communication 
deficiencies 
6% 
Improper decision to land 6% 
 
     CRM is a concept of operation and how people work together (Diehl [1]). Its 
concepts are based on cognitive and interpersonal skills needed to manage 
resources in an organisation, between organisations and between people. The key 
word is communication. Communication between all involved in a flight and 
effective ways of maintaining a professional standing is the fundamental focus 
[7]. For example, telling someone does not mean they understand the task given. 
There may be a variety of reasons why it was not understood: language, clarify 
of description, inflection in the voice, etc.  
     Assumptions are made by those that give information and those that receive 
information. In figure 4 below it shows how items may be identified, look 
closely at B and 13. When the letter B is read in conjunction with other letters it 
may be very easy to identify, when read in conjunction with numbers there are 
concerns. Of course dyslexia, colour blindness and if any visual impairments can 
result in errors, likewise audible clarity cannot easily be determined in crash 
investigations if English is not spoken clearly. This is compounded when the 
strength of radio communication is affected by background electronic noise, etc. 
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 Figure 4: Ways items can be identified. 
 
 
     Human factors in CRM has developed a method known as the SHEL model. 
This is a method where the human is seen as the middle interface [8]. It can be 
helpful to use a model to aid in the understanding of human factors, or as a 
framework around which human factors issues can be structured. A model, 
which is often used is the SHEL model, a name derived from the initial letters of 
its components: 
 
 Software (e.g. maintenance procedures, maintenance manuals, checklist 
layout, etc.) 
 Hardware (e.g. tools, test equipment, the physical structure of aircraft, design 
of flight decks, positioning and operating sense of controls and instruments, 
etc.) 
 Environment (e.g. physical environment such as conditions in the hangar, 
conditions on the line, etc. and work environment such as work patterns, 
management structures, public perception of the industry, etc.) 
 Liveware (e.g. the person or people at the centre of the model, including 
maintenance engineers, supervisors, planners, managers, etc.) 
 Human factors concentrates on the interfaces between the human (the ‘L’ in 
the centre box) and the other elements of the SHEL model, and (from a safety 
viewpoint) where these elements can be deficient, e.g.: 
 
S: Misinterpretation of procedures, badly written manuals, poorly 
designed checklists, untested or difficult to use computer software 
H: Not enough tools, inappropriate equipment, poor aircraft design for 
maintainability 
E: Uncomfortable workplace, inadequate hangar space, extreme 
temperatures, excessive noise, poor lighting 
L: Relationships with other people, shortage of manpower, lack of 
supervision, lack of support from managers. 
Man – the ‘Liveware’ – can perform a wide range of activities.  
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 Figure 5: The SHELL model for interfacing with systems. 
     Affective CRM is meant to be there for all instances, but perhaps the most 
critical is when there is a difference in experiences. A junior co-pilot flying 
alongside an experienced Captain might feel intimidated to say if something is 
not right for fear of being wrong, rebuffed or over-crossing a professional line. 
This can be compounded when dealing with military and their ranks or in 
cultures where age is seen as experience and to challenge is disrespectful [9]. 
Such situations can occur in nursing, a junior nurse dealing with an experienced 
ward manager or in an operating theatre with a senior consultant are examples. 
2 Nursing practices 
Nursing no longer has the historical image of ladies helping keep wards clean 
and making beds before handing out the medicine. It has evolved extensively 
since the 1990s to be a degree based discipline that specialises with high tech 
equipment and interfacing with many different medical disciplines [10]. Theatre 
nursing, midwifery and intensive care nursing often involve dealing with senior 
medical doctors and surgeons. Likewise, they have a hierarchy where junior or 
newly qualified staff is under the same peer pressures as pilots and aircraft 
maintainers. Peer pressure, the possibility of identifying errors under the fear of 
embarrassment is a risk in nursing equal to those of the aviation industry. There 
are many incidences where injury and death have resulted from mistakes not 
being identified and others failing to comment due to peer pressures at work 
[11]. There are parallels with the aviation industry that can be used as 
benchmarking for reducing the likelihood of mistakes to patients and the patent 
care process. 
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     Anesthetic care was studied for mishaps, errors and mistakes and this 
extensive study produced the following classifications listed below. In such an 
environment where time is critical, pressure of failure and dealing with relatives, 
etc, add major input concerns that compound to result in potential disasters. 
Below in the table shows the result from one such study [12]. This list is 
representative of errors experienced in the aviation maintenance sector (Current 
Anaesthesia and Critical Care, 1995 [22]). Human error accounts for the 
principal reasons for a problem. Nursing that covers 24 hours a day for 365 days 
in a year can be paralleled with aviation maintenance and pilots/ATC work 
patterns. It cannot be over emphasised the parallels that compare between these 
two different but allied worlds of pressure and expectations. Each of these 
failures apart for the 10th and 12th have been a cause many aircraft accidents [13]. 
If proven and effective ways are readily available in other sectors then it is 
difficult to argue against minimising risks by employing them in the hospital 
environment. 
Table 2:  Classifications for aesthetic errors. 
Failure Percentage 
Misjudgement 16 
Failure to check equipment 13 
Fault of technique 13 
Other human factors problems 13 
Other equipment problem 13 
Inattention 12 
Haste 12 
Inexperience 11 
Communication problem 9 
Inadequate preoperative assessment 7 
Monitor problem 6 
Inadequate preoperative preparation 4 
 
     Medication errors have been shown to be as high as 11% of patient incidents, 
(National Reporting and Learning System, 2012 [20]) in England and Wales 
between June 2010 and June 2011. Although, approximately 90% of the 100,000 
plus incidents that were reported caused no noticeable harm to patients, 253 
resulted in problems that required further emergency medical intervention and 
over 50 deaths. Such medication errors are most likely to be attributable to the 
wrong dose, omitted or delayed medication or the wrong medication (National 
Patient Safety Agency, 2009 [20]). There is no established method universally 
adopted for minimising risk in medication errors. A computer based recording 
and monitoring system cannot mitigate the effects from pressure, shift work and 
tiredness. Within aviation there are limits in time worked as to when procedures 
can be informed, for example, limiting the time a pilot can fly or be on standby. 
This subject, above all else, is where human factors and training for the ‘dirty 
dozen’ (the most common classifications of errors, mishaps and mistakes) could 
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be argued to have the biggest impact in reducing the risk of errors in 
administering drugs. Each year in aviation every maintainer must undertake a 
training course in human factors, similar to CPR or child protection training. If 
not completed and the assessment passed they are prevented from working on 
any aircraft. Evidence has paralleled its introduction and reduction in errors, 
mishaps and mistakes [14].   
     The most frequently cited wrong-dose error results from a calculation error. A 
major drive by the NHS has been to remove these by trying different approaches. 
In figure 6 below is one such attempt. Will wearing such a top stop errors, 
remove people interrupting? It is as if stating speed limit signs will slow drivers 
speed. A system approach of CRM is needed to make inroads into this problem 
and minimise risk [15]. Effective drug administration must be managed in a 
system approach and continuous training is at the very core of reducing risks. 
     CRM is more than training, it is equipping people with the skills, ability and 
confidence to undertake a job function professionally and deal with extreme 
situations that may not have been covered in training. Furthermore there are 
individual techniques that are discussed below to assist in detail risk evaluation 
and error removal. No one technique or procedure will ever remove risk; several 
in series will collectively conflate the efforts to result in very low probabilities of 
errors [16]. If the SHELL model is applied to this process and think of the 
middle as the nurse, the S (software) will be the electronic recording,  
H (Hardware) the container, recording method, E (environment) lighting level, 
and finally L (Liveware) those other professionals sharing the task. All have to 
be effective for the success, but each person can recognise if any mishap, error or 
omission.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Drug error reduction procedure. 
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     There are numerous parallels between the aviation and nursing sectors. 
Clearly there are lessons that can be learned and applied to integrate human 
factors into the nursing profession. It could be to implement human factor 
training and yearly follow ups as required for other techniques, e.g., lifesaving. 
However, we need to evaluate risk. More specifically, reducing risk of an error 
occurring. Here the suggestion is the Swiss Cheese Method.  
     The principle behind this model can be considered in reverse. For a hazard to 
result in an error occurring the individual stages that contribute must align, for 
example, the medication dose is unclear, pressure to administer, distractions 
when calculation dosage [17]. When these all happen then the wrong dosage will 
be delivered. This method is to review each stage that can go wrong, add 
individual procedures to minimise and do the same for each stage. Thus, 
collectively the likelihood reduces for a total system failure.  
     This model can be applied to drug rounds [18, 19]. The staff trained and 
records kept, yearly up dates, sufficient time, and correct information coupled 
with all associated equipment to administer, record and document. Each one is a 
barrier, collectively they are a more robust barrier to minimise risk. These 
methods add to those of conventional risk analysis, as Failure Mode Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), which will evaluate the probability of a risk.  Here, CRM is 
not interested in the actual probability of a failure but that procedures will add 
layer after layer to reduce the possibility [20]. The ultimate probability of any 
failure will be linked to the probability of the severity, the occurrence and 
detection. If not severe and unlikely to occur it could be argued the detection 
system can be basic [21]. Alternatively, if moderate in severity and a common 
occurrence then a robust detection system is needed. Balancing systems is more 
detailed than just reviewing the severity of a problem. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: A representation of the principal approach. Only when all the risks 
occur will the end result be a failure, omission, mishap or disaster. 
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3 Conclusions 
This paper has addressed the need and development of human factors in the 
aviation industry and how Crew Resource Management has evolved for Pilots, 
Air Traffic Controllers and maintainers. These techniques can be exploited 
within the nursing and medical industry where numerous parallels can be drawn. 
These parallels of peer pressure, life pressures, life and death situations where 
problems can occur that are unique and require expert intervention. If we want to 
reduce risks in nursing there is no need to invent new solutions, we can use the 
tried and trusted methods that has served the aviation well during the last three 
decades. 
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